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Abstract: 
The literature and anecdotal evidence suggests that that there is more to tenancy selection (firm 
location) than the profit maximisation drive that traditional neo-classical economic location 
theory suggests.  
 
In the first instance these models assume property markets are rational and perfectly competitive; 
the CBD office market is clearly neither rational nor perfectly competitive. This fact alone 
relegates such models to the margins of usefulness for an industry that seeks to satisfy tenant 
demand in order to optimise returns on capital invested. 
 
Acknowledgment of property market imperfections are universally accepted to the extent that all 
contemporary texts discuss the lack of a coherent centralised market place and incomplete and 
poorly disseminated information processes as fundamental inadequacies which characterise the 
property market inefficiencies. Less well researched are the facets of the market which allow the 
observer to determine market activity to be significantly irrational. 
 
One such facet is that of ‘decision maker preferences’. The decision to locate a business operation 
at one location as opposed to another seems ostensibly a routine choice based on short, medium 
and long term business objectives. These objectives are derived from a process of strategic 
planning by one or more individuals whose goal is held to be to optimise outcomes which benefit 
the business (and presumably those employed within it). However the decision making processes 
appear bounded by how firms function, the institutional context in which they operate, as well as 
by opportunistic behaviour by individual decision makers who allow personal preferences to 
infiltrate and ‘corrupt’ the process. In this way, history, culture, geography, as well as institutions 
all become significant to the extent that these influence and shape individual behaviour  which in 
turn determine the morphology of individual preferences, as well as providing a conduit for them 
to take effect. 
 
This paper exams historical and current literature on the impact of individual behaviour in the 
decision making process within organisations as a precursor to an investigation of the tenancy 
decision making process within the CBD office market. Literature on the topic falls within a 
number of research disciplines, philosophy, psychology and economics to name a few. Here, the 
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author limits the review to writings which fall within the remit of strategic management and 
strategic leadership theory. Subsequent reviews will explore other areas to complete the picture. 
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Neo-classical economic research which seek to model the process by which organisations choose 
to establish their business operations, assume that markets are both rational and perfectly 
competitive and those firms make decisions based upon their unwavering determination to 
maximise profits. 
The CBD office market is clearly neither rational nor perfectly competitive. Similarly decisions 
leading to sub-optimal behaviour (Smith 1981) must occur in a market where the vast array of 
information needed to ‘maximise’ is absent (North 1990). 
Neo-classical models are therefore of limited use for a proper analysis and understanding of those 
factors which influence a tenant to select one tenancy in preference to another (firm location).  
A more representative model can be created if we strip away the competitive and maximising 
assumptions. The resultant model allows us to take account of a clearly observable characteristic 
of the decision making process wherein the firm’s (individuals or group) decision makers adopt 
‘strategic behaviour’ in an effort to achieve ‘abnormal profits’ (additional advantage) from the 
selection process. In this way individuals within firms (individually or jointly) can exercise (to 
some degree) their own preferences and beliefs even where these may be in conflict with the 
stated (and agreed) objectives of the organisation.  Hence decision makers (individuals or groups) 
may be seen to adopt 'opportunistic behaviour’ to achieve satisfaction of their own preferences at 
the expense of the organisation (Ball, Lizieri and MacGregor 1998). 
Once ‘strategic behaviour’ is imported into the modelling process, other factors, history, 
geography, culture, education and institutions (practices, customs and networks) and in particular 
individual behaviour and the institutional context in which decisions are made, become important 
to the extent that these influence decision maker preferences and therefore the tenancy selection 
process. Under these circumstances knowledge and reactions to it (decisions) are ‘bounded’ by 
external and internal conditioning which may limit the number of decisions which can ever be 
based on the kind of rational maximising criteria assumed under traditional modelling 
assumptions. 
Tenancy selection is just one decision in an array of decisions made by company executives in the 
course of their tenure. Unlike day to day operational decisions however where a company should 
locate and the type of accommodation needed is a strategic decision. To begin to understand the 
process therefore requires an understanding of the ‘firm’ and the strategic management and 
decision making apparatus which exist and those factors which influence it. It is to the strategic 
management literature therefore that we turn to begin our understanding. 
The evolution of Strategic Management and Leadership Theory – an Overview 
The studies of strategic management and strategic leadership theory have progressed side by side 
since the early 1960’s. Seminal works building on the corporate structure and executive 
management writings of researchers such as Barnard (1938), by Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965) 
and Andrews (1971) provided the foundation for the development of what has become the 
expanding field of strategic management.  
During the same period a number of organisational theories began to emerge. These stressed the 
influence of the ‘situation’ (the context in which the decision is made) as a determinant of 
 2
managerial behaviours and organisational outcomes ( Thompson, 1967; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Williamson, 1979).  
The significance of personality and its interface with ‘situation’ also began to generate thought. 
Simon, (1945) and Cyert and March, (1963) developed their behavioural perspectives by 
emphasising internal processes and characteristics such as decision making processes, 
information processing limitations, power and coalitions, and hierarchical structures. While 
researchers like Selznick (1957) and Penrose (1959) brought forward the notions of ‘distinctive 
competencies’ and leadership as fundamental internal resources needed for corporate growth and 
diversification. 
The early emphasis of strategic management and leadership research focused therefore on events 
and interactions from inside the corporate ‘black box’. The internal strengths and managerial 
capabilities of firms and how these affected performance were considered paramount. 
In an attempt to introduce academic rigour, researchers of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s began 
to move away from the normative, ‘best practice’ approach offered by the likes of Ansoff and 
Andrews. The mathematical modelling methods of microeconomics provided the impetus and the 
pursuit of neat scientific theory became the goal. This movement in methodology heralded the era 
of industrial organisation economics .With its emphasis on quantitative methods industrial 
organisation economics gravitated towards industry structure and competitive position in the 
industry. The focus at this stage had moved almost exclusively to consider issues outside the 
‘black box’ as analysis of the internal workings of the firm took a backseat to those external 
issues which lent themselves more readily to the ‘new science’ and the mathematical modelling it 
favoured.  
While to some the ‘new science’ seemed incongruous in its dealings with the firm and the human 
condition which was so much a part of its structure, and which sought rationality where there was 
none, there were, nonetheless, a number of notable works arising from this era.  Probably the 
most influential was Porter (1980, 1985). Porter developed a structural analytical framework 
(Five Forces Model) that provided an understanding of the structure of an industry. Using his 
model he was able to determine that the ability of a firm to gain competitive advantage rests with 
how well it positions and differentiates itself from its competitors. The concept of competitive 
advantage and differentiation within an industry was a significant one as it marked a major move 
away from the microeconomic concept of industry as a homogenous group differentiated only on 
the basis of market share, and provided the theoretical framework for the concept of heterogenous 
strategic groupings within an industry. 
The strategic groupings concept fitted well a corporate environment typified by rapid economic 
expansion and the globalisation of world markets which was now well established, at least in the 
west. It was an environment of developing free markets and intense competition. Under these 
conditions only those companies whose structures were suitably adaptive and were able to 
accommodate the ‘new competitive dynamics’ would survive and prosper. The fact that some 
firms prospered while other failed in this new environment was testament to the obvious fact that 
heterogenous strategic groupings within industry was a reality. Porter’s work allowed theory to 
catch-up with reality in a clear and significantly meaningful way. 
Competitive dynamics and developing work on boundary relationships between the firm and its 
environment (Karnani and Wernerfelt , 1985) began to focus strategic management research back 
to internal firm characteristics – back inside the ‘black box’ allowing organisational economic 
theory to emerge as the dominant force in organisation research.  Transaction cost analysis 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) were seminal works 
during this period. These theories examine the firm through a contractual or exchange-based 
approach and suggest that firms may be viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts’. In tandem these theories 
have been the stimulus for much of the work which has followed; firm boundaries and market 
hierarchies (Hoskisson, Hill and Kim, 1993), vertical integration and strategic alliances (Kogut, 
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1988) and corporate governance (Eisenhardt, 1989, Hoskisson and Turk, 1990). Though 25 years 
have passed since they were first brought to prominence their influence still pervades and they 
provide fertile ground for contemporary researchers of strategic management (Ooi, 2000, 
Managerial opportunism; Rutledge & Karim, 1999, self-interest; Salter & Sharp, 2001, Agency 
effects; Scott, 2002, Dominant preferences). 
Transaction cost economics and agency theory have refocused research back to the inner 
workings of the firm. They have allowed researches to revisit the work of pioneers such as 
Penrose (1959) and have lead to the emergence of the contemporary resource and knowledge-
based views of the firm which have proved fruitful research areas (Kogut and Zander 1992). 
Furthermore the re-emergence of internal ‘black box’ issues such as behaviour, relationships, 
leadership styles and so forth, has brought with it a new acceptance of qualitative research 
methods which has allowed a legitimate expansion of research into real world issues within the 
firm (Cannella and Monroe, 1997). 
 
Major Theoretical Contributions  - a detailed review 
Industrial Organisation Theory 
Economic theories of the firm, particularly industrial organisation theories (Tirole,1988) have 
viewed the firm as a profit-maximising production ‘black box’  with output decisions based on 
assumptions about human behaviour which largely ignore contemporary psychological research 
(Wakeley, 1997) and which treat decision makers as an homogenous group of depersonalised 
profit maximisers (Boone et al, 1998) that behave in exactly the same way when confronted with 
the same decision environment (Boone et al, 1999).  
A failure of industrial organisation theory to take account of the internal workings of the ‘black 
box’ and in particular its treatment of decision makers as abstract homogenous profit maximisers 
render IO theory of limited use in our proposed research. An examination of individual 
preferences implicitly assumes heterogeneity among decision makers. Without this assumption all 
tenants, given the same set of conditions, would arrive at the same conclusions regarding their 
tenancy needs.  Were this the case the market would demonstrate considerably less complexity 
and considerably more predictability that it clearly does. 
Organisational EconomicTheory 
Organisational theory goes some way to correcting the deficiencies of industrial organisation 
theory in that it ventures back into the ‘black box’ in an attempt to understand an organisation’s 
structure and function. Its contribution stems from two principal subset theories; transaction cost 
economics and agency theory. 
Transaction Costs Economics 
Williamson’s (1975, 1985) formulation of transaction costs economics seeks to explain why 
organisations exist. The basic premise is that markets and hierarchies are alternative governance 
mechanisms for completing transactions.  
Transaction cost economics establishes a set of assumptions about human behaviour and 
attributes of transactions that affect dealings between two firms (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan and Yiu, 
1999). The two central behavioural assumptions are bounded rationality and opportunism (Foss 
and Koch, 1996); uncertainty, small numbers, and asset specificity are further integral 
assumptions (Williamson, 1975, 1985). The unit of measure is the firm level transaction wherein 
the minimisation of transaction costs is the efficient outcome; bounded decisions and 
opportunistic behaviour by decision makers are held to lead to (high) transaction cost 
inefficiencies and adverse performance outcomes. 
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The foundations of the concept of bounded rationality are generally attributed to Herbert Simon 
(1945) in his seminal work ‘Administrative Behaviour’ and developed further in his 1955 paper 
‘A behavioural theory of rational choice’. 
Traditional microeconomic theory simplifies the decision making process by assuming that a 
substantially rational choice can be made without cost (Pringle, 1997). Under this assumption 
economic man is ‘unboundedly rational’. This assumption however is clearly unrealistic. Based 
upon the work of the Carnegie School (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958), the 
contrary view, the view that decisions in organisations are taken by boundedly rational people has 
become an integral assumption in the field of organisational economics. 
According to the Carnegie School decision makers’ rationality is bounded by the limited ability 
of individuals to process all information relevant for taking decisions in complex environments. 
In order to cope with this information overload decision makers process only part of the relevant 
information and filter information according to their own cognitive base. This base comprises 
assumptions concerning future events, knowledge of alternatives and the consequences of 
alternatives if acted upon (March and Simon, 1958). An individual’s personal cognitive base is 
formed by their life experiences, including formal training and work experiences. It is argued 
therefore that a decision maker’s perception of, and response to, environmental stimuli will be 
partly shaped by their individual demography. 
In their work towards the formation of upper echelon theory, Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
demonstrated the potency of demographic variables such as age and gender, and the individual’s 
functional, educational and socio-economic background on the executive team’s organisational 
decisions (Boone, van Olffen and Witteloostuijin, 1998). The upper echelon model determined 
two classes of managerial characteristics which served to bound the decision making process of 
managers; one observable, including personal and group dynamic variables, and one 
psychological, including the individual’s cognitive base and values. In combination these are held 
to shape the strategic choices managers make and ultimately the performance outcomes of the 
organisation.  
The study of opportunistic behaviour has become integral to our understanding of organisational 
behaviour (Foss and Koch, 1996; Boone and van Witteloostuijin, 1999; Nagin,Rebitzer, Sanders 
and Taylor, 2002)  In particular it holds pre-eminent positions in the areas of agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976: Fama & Jensen, 1983) , work on executive pay and incentives (eg 
Kunz and Pfaff, 2002), cognitive moral development and intrinsic motivation (Rutledge and 
Karim, 1999; Kunz and Pfaff, 2002) as well as transaction cost economics.  
Models based upon opportunistic behaviour take a cynical view of human nature. In a managerial 
context they assume managers make decisions which are ultimately self-serving even where these 
may result in sub-optimal organisational performance outcomes. On occasions these decision may 
even be in conflict with stated organisational aims and objectives.  
Nagin et al, (2002) provide a useful overview of the primary opportunistic models; the rational 
cheater model, the conscience model, and the impulse control model. Nagin and his co-authors 
note that while these models have distinctive empirical predictions they are neither competing nor 
mutually exclusive explanations of opportunistic behaviour.  
Williamson (1985, p.47) described opportunism as ‘…self-interest seeking with guile.’  Lying, 
stealing and cheating  were not considered beyond the remit of opportunistic behaviour among 
mangers and employees. However more subtle misdemeanours were also consider to be 
representative of opportunistic, self-serving behaviour; incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information, especially where these acts were associated with calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse their principals, shareholders or fellow managers 
and employees, are held to be equally valid examples of opportunistic behaviour. 
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While this appears a damning view of human nature, and while opportunistic behaviour remains a 
central behavioural assumption of organisational economics, Williamson (1981) himself notes 
that not all economic agents behave in this way. Instead he clearly holds that it is sufficient that 
some agents behave in this fashion for significant transaction cost inefficiencies to arise. Foss and 
Koch (1996) developed this idea further and observed that the notion of opportunistic behaviour 
is hard to repudiate because within any organisation it is unlikely that there will be no individuals 
behaving opportunistically, and secondly, that opportunistic individuals are hard to distinguish 
from the non-opportunists. This gives principals a dilemma, seek out and remove the opportunist 
(if they can be found) or allow them to continue with increased corporate governance; either 
strategy may have significant transaction cost and performance implications.  
Agency Theory    
Agency theory has emerged as an integral part of the financial economics literature (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976: Fama & Jensen, 1983) and has become a key area of research in the area of 
strategic management over the last two decades (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 1999). Primarily 
drawing on the property rights literature (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) and transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1975, 1985), agency theory posits that due to the separation of ownership 
and control in modern corporations, there is often a divergence of interests between shareholders 
(the owners) and managers (the agents of the owners). Similar to transaction cost theory, agency 
theory assumes that human beings are boundedly rational, self-interested, and opportunistic 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), and therefore that managers will seek to maximise their own interests even at 
the expense of the shareholders or non-managing owners.  
In terms of organisation theory, the benefit of agency theory to this study, is that it seeks to enter 
the ‘black box’ and examine the causes and consequences of agency conflict between owners and 
managers within organisations. It is held that this conflict may have short to medium term sub-
optimal performance outcomes where tenancy selection is based on decision makers’ preferences 
rather than business imperatives. 
Strategy researchers have applied agency theory to a number of substantive topics including 
innovation, corporate governance, and diversification with results that are generally consistent 
with the prediction of agency theory. In this way managers may, for example, have an incentive 
to pursue a strategy of diversification especially unrelated diversification, in order to diversify 
their own employment risk (Hoskisson & Turk 1990) Similarly, because firm size and executive 
compensation are highly correlated  (Tossi & Gomez-Meija, 1989) managers may have an 
incentive to increase the size of the firm to obtain higher levels of personal remuneration 
regardless of whether such a decision is ultimately in the best interest of the organisation and the 
principals. 
Work has been done to examine the role of internal and external governance to mitigate agency 
costs. Board composition (Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Hill and Snell 1988; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989), ownership structures ( Bethel and Liebeskind,1993; Hill and Snell,1988; Kosnik 
1990), and executive compensation (Gomez-Meija, 1994; Hoskisson, Hitt, Turk and Tyler,1989) 
may be used to mitigate the effects of manager’s acting in their own self-interest. External 
governance mechanisms such as the market become more relevant when internal governance 
devices are unable to mitigate agency costs (Walsh and Kosnik, 1993; Walsh and Seaward, 1990). 
However there are no perfect governance devices that fully eliminate agency conflicts and 
managers often seem able to devise means to reduce the effectiveness of governance devices 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 1999). 
Agency conflicts may also affect innovation where the manager’s own attitude to risk will 
influence the corporate decision to invest in R&D. This may lead to reduced competitiveness and 
lower performance. 
Kochhar and David  (1996) found that firms under institutional ownership tended to invest more 
in innovation. The authors attribute this to the institutions’ ability to ensure that managers 
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maintain the firm’s investment in innovation to enhance competitiveness through strict corporate 
governance. 
Instead of industry structure variables such as market concentration or scale economies that 
determine firm behaviours and performance as postulated by industrial organisation research, 
organisational economics see managerial motives (opportunism) and capabilities (bounded 
rationality), information asymmetry, contracts enforcement, performance evaluation and 
transaction relationships between the two parties (firms in transaction cost economics, and 
owners and agents in agency theory) as the main drivers of firm strategy and performance. 
A number of researchers have embraced organisational economics over traditional 
microeconomic analysis on the basis of methodology. Traditional microeconomic analysis of the 
firm has become increasingly mathematically orientated (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 1999; 
Rumelt et al, 1994) and the move to make research less mathematical and more relevant to actual 
business has lead strategic management researchers to the filed of organisational economics with 
its focus on institutional details and human behaviour as exhibited by managers. A similar 
movement away from a mathematical approach lead early researchers such as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) to modify the more mathematical, normative principal-agent theory in favour of 
the more humanistic approach as exemplified in contemporary positivist agency theory (See 
Cannella & Monroe 1997 for a broader explanation). 
The movement away from the rigorous scientific standard imposed by a mathematically based 
research method has not however been without its critics. Criticism centres on the significant 
challenges imposed on both transaction cost theory and agency theory to develop valid empirical 
research methods to measure the ‘unobservables’ (such as the key variables of opportunism and 
the degree of divergent interests)  inherent in any humanistic approach to firm analysis (Godfry 
and Hill, 1995).  Hoskisson and Hitt (1990) note that research on the relationship between agency 
motives and diversification has been limited because managers are unlikely to admit that agency 
motives are present in decision making and unambiguous indicators of the effects of governance 
mechanisms on agents’ behaviours are difficult to isolate. As a result researchers have to rely on 
more speculative theory and indirect research on governance mechanisms such as ownership 
structures and executive compensation.  
Other researchers have turned to the field of psychology and the behavioural sciences for more 
appropriate methodologies and insight into the role of the human condition in the strategic 
management and decision making processes. Witt (1991) examined the relationship between 
economics, socio-biology and behavioural psychology on the empirical theory of preferences 
which he contended was lacking in the traditional economic model of behaviour. Witt concluded 
that a comprehensive theory of decision making and preferences cannot ignore the influences of 
innate learning mechanisms in higher order beings and that a proper insight into the occurrence of 
preferences in the decision making process would have to acknowledge and incorporate 
behavioural psychology. Later work by Scott A (2002) looking at decision making amongst 
health care recipients reached similar conclusions. Scott observed that, among other factors, the 
complexity of choice and an individual’s past experiences were dominant factors that influenced 
the individual’s selection of health care options. 
Methodological problems such as those cited above pose significant challenges to strategic 
management researchers and create debate among researchers holding different assumptions 
about the nature of human motives (Cannella and Monroe, 1997). Nonetheless organisational 
economics continues to lead the charge for a comprehensive understanding of the internal 
workings or organisations and external consequences of their actions.  
While transaction cost theory and agency theory provide substantial frameworks for an 
understanding of how firms operate, some argue (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) that they fail 
to reflect adequately the idiosyncratic nature of firms and how this might affect their competitive 
advantage. These researchers observe that the heterogeneity of firms in differing industry groups 
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and even within the same industry groups is of importance and stems from differentiation of 
tangible and intangible resources within firms. 
 
The Resource-based View 
Penrose (1959) had considered firms as a collection of productive resources and observed that 
these resources were sufficiently differentiated so as to be useful to explain the idiosyncratic 
nature of firms. Subsequent work by Chandler (1962) and Andrews (1972) examined the notion 
that firm structure and competencies (and competitiveness) were directly related to the 
availability (or lack thereof) of tangible and intangible resources of the type discussed by Penrose 
(1959) and the earlier work of Selznick (1957) on the identification of distinctive competencies 
within firms. The work of these, and other researches, has lead to the formulation of a resource-
based view of organisations. 
The resource-based view is fundamentally concerned with why firms are different and how they 
achieve and maintain a competitive advantage as a result of those differences. Significant 
resource sub-sets arising from the resource-based view are strategic leadership and tacit 
knowledge both of which have provided fertile areas of research (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 
1999).  For Penrose (1959) resources were defined as the physical things a firm buys, leases, or 
produces for its own use, and the people hired on terms that make them effectively part of the 
firm. Furthermore Penrose (1959) emphasised the interaction between the material and human 
resources as being integral to performance. 
The resource-based view is therefore distinctly different from the traditional microeconomic view 
of the firm as a homogenous black box. It recognises resource differences and uses them to 
explain performance differentiation amongst firms within markets.  
The resource-based view has stimulated much research in a variety of resource areas: the impact 
of unique business experience (Huff, 1982; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986); organisational culture 
(Barney, 1986, Fiol, 1991); organisational learning (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997), 
entrepreneurship (Nelson, 1991; Remult, 1987), and human resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993) are some examples. 
One seminal work in the area was that of Barney (1991) in which he proposed a measure of 
resources by virtue of their rareness, value, inimitability and substitutability. However Barney’s 
(1991) work has drawn subsequent criticism  (Black and Boal,1994) because of its treatment of 
resources as separate and distinct factors and not as bundles of resources with specific 
interrelationships (Grant, 1991) which in combination give rise to a firms individual 
competencies and competitive advantage.  
Strategic Leadership and Strategic Decision Theory 
Escalating CEO salaries and the personality cults that develop around leaders of large firms, 
together with share price fluctuations which occur on appointment or resignations of particular 
individuals, demonstrate the significance of strategic leadership in the minds of the community 
and the market. To the extent that individual leaders are unique they offer firms a potentially 
unique resource and may therefore significantly add to differentiation between firms within the 
market. 
Strategic leadership however does not focus solely on the individual. Differing company 
management structures require a broader approach and strategic leadership considers 
management teams and other governance bodies, in particular boards of directors, as well as 
individual CEO, as indicators of how firms operate. 
In agency theory top managers are viewed as agents of principals who act with their own self-
interest and agendas in mind (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen 
1983).However agency theory tends to undervalue the positive aspects of executive leadership 
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and largely ignores the role of strategic leaders in organisational success. Instead it focuses on the 
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control (Cannella and Monroe, 1997).  
Strategic leadership on the other hand postulates that firms are reflections of their top managers 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and that the specific knowledge, experience, values and preferences 
of top managers are reflected not only in their decisions but in their assessment of decision 
situations. This theory was formalised as upper echelons theory and later developed into strategic 
leadership theory (Finkelstien and Hambrick, 1996). Strategic leadership theory examines the 
psychological make-up of top managers to explain their strategic choices and assumes top 
managers vary on a profile of psychological constructs such as knowledge and experience (see 
above) to influence the strategic choices they make. 
Strategic leadership theory therefore incorporates many of the assumptions that serve to limit 
positive agency theory. It takes account of individual differences by the incorporation of various 
psychological constructs. Positive agency theory on the other hand only accommodates individual 
differences in a very general way (Cannella and Monroe, 1997) through managerial self-interest 
and the principals’ desire to maximise wealth; differentiation by reference to psychological 
constructs is not considered. Furthermore, and contrary to agency theory, strategic leadership 
theory implies that executives need discretion or freedom in the decision making process to be 
effective as managers. Agency theory implies that such freedom will only result in decisions 
designed to further promote the agent’s self-interest thereby detracting from the wealth-
maximisation aims of their principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Mintzberg (1973), Kotter (1982) and Tsui, (1984) categorised the managerial role into three 
categories: interpersonal, informational and decisional. Early work by March and Simon (1958) 
proposed that top managers are embedded in a situation of ‘ambiguity, complexity, and often 
information overload. In such circumstances the decision maker’s personal frame of reference, 
experiences, education, functional background and other personal attributes (personality) have 
significant effects on their decisions and subsequent actions (bounded rationality).  
Some empirical studies have directly examined the link between psychological make-up and 
organisational strategy and these generally support strategic leadership theory. Andrews, 1972 
showed that values can affect an executive’s selection of strategies. Cognitive structures have 
been linked to organisational strategies such as joint ventures (Fiol, 1989), breadth of product and 
service offerings (Day and Lord, 1992) and innovation and growth (Thomas, Clark and Gioia, 
1993). Nutt (1986) used Jung’s typology of cognitive styles to differentiate risk propensities 
among executives. The need for achievement has been linked with organisational structures 
(Miller and Droge 1986). Locus of control has been determined as a predictor of organisational 
performance and strategy (Miller , Kets de Vries and Toulouse, 1982) while organisational 
dysfunction has been found to be related to managers’ neuroses (Kets de Vries and Miller, 1984).  
Demographic variables such formal education, training and functional background have been 
linked to organisational outcomes (Hambrick and Mason 1985; Kotter, 1982). A background in R 
& D and marketing showed an increased likelihood of success in the implementation of a 
prospector strategy (seeking out new products and markets) (Miles and Snow, 1978). A 
background in finance and production was linked to success with defender strategies (Gupta and 
Givindarajan, 1984). Formal education was linked to a greater propensity for innovative strategies 
(Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). While organisational performance has been found to be 
associated with an executive’s past performance record (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1986), and, 
management team size, composition and tenure (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Smith et al, 
1994).  
Later work (Wu, Lin and Lee, 2000) on personal characteristics, decision making patterns and 
leadership styles among women managers in the USA, Taiwan and Japan, indicated further 
differentiation based on gender and culture. Salter and Sharp (2001) in a study of culturally 
similar markets in the USA, Canada and the UK, determined that even small cultural differences 
were reflected in managers’ approach to escalation of support to failing projects. The study 
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concluded that the more ‘individualistic’ US managers had a greater tendency to stick with 
projects to which they has committed even where the chances of success were subsequently 
determined to be low.  
The influence of managers with regard to individual decisions, strategic policy and organisational 
culture is dependent on the degree to which managers are free to act. In agency theory this 
freedom is viewed somewhat negatively in that freedom provides opportunities to promote 
managers’ self-interest. Strategic leadership theory takes a somewhat more positive view 
suggesting that such freedom allows company executives an opportunity to put their mark on the 
company with potentially positive performance outcomes. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) 
termed this freedom ‘managerial discretion’. Empirical attempts have been made to identify high 
and low discretion industries (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; 
Hambrick and Abrahamson,1995). Managerial discretion which links the individual 
characteristics of strategic leaders with organisational factors is believed to be a fruitful area for 
future strategic leadership research (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan and 
Yu, 1999). 
Knowledge-based view of the firm 
The knowledge-based view of the firm is an extension of the resource-based view. Its focus is to 
conceptualise firms as heterogenous knowledge-bearing entities. It first appeared in the literature 
in the mid 1960’s and is attributed to the work of Polanyi (1966). Polanyi classified knowledge 
into two categories 1) explicit or codified knowledge which is transmittable in formal, systematic 
language. 2) tacit knowledge which has a personal quality and is therefore difficult to formalise 
and communicate. Zander and Kogut (1995) refined the work of Polanyi and developed the 
construct of knowledge into five dimensions 1)codifiablity 2)teachability  3)complexity 4)system 
dependence and 5)product observability. Earlier the authors (Kogut and Zander, 1992) had 
observed that the assumptions of selfishness intrinsic in agency theory, are not necessarily a 
precursor for ‘shirking and dishonesty’. Instead, linking the concept with the knowledge-based 
view of the firm, they viewed the firm as a repository of capabilities in which individual and 
social expertise is transformed into economically viable products. In this way the firm formed a 
social community of voluntaristic action wherein the combined knowledge (explicit and tacit) 
outperformed the market by providing the firm with a distinct competitive advantage. By 
definition a firms ability to grow under the knowledge-based view requires that the firm have to 
the resources to absorb and develop new knowledge and competencies  (Nonaka,1994) through 
the process of meta-learning; the capacity to learn continuously (Lei,Hitt and Bettis, 1996).  
 
Conclusion  
Organisational decision making, which forms the nexus of the tenancy selection process, is a 
significant and well researched area of study. While the review of literature discussed here would 
appear extensive, it probably only begins to scratch the surface in a field of study which 
encompasses such a diverse range of disciplines and methodologies. A consistent theme however 
appears throughout; the need to peer into the ‘black-box’, to view the internal workings of 
organisations and the resources (particularly human resources) at its disposal. 
The literature supports the contention that neoclassical economic models which emphasize perfect 
competition and rational behaviour to explain how and why decisions within organisations have 
been made in the past, and how they may be made in the future, while ignoring the environmental 
context in which they are made and the socio-psychological propensities and preferences of the 
decision maker (s), are fundamentally flawed. While these models are attractive for the simplicity 
they offer, it is this simplicity which limits their usefulness in achieving a reality-based 
understanding of how decisions, including tenancy decisions, might be made. By ignoring the 
uncertainties of the human dimension for the certainties of mathematical analysis they effectively 
destroy their viability as an analysis tool. 
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The literature clearly determines that any model of the tenancy selection process will be a 
complex arrangement of many disciplines including philosophy, sociology, psychology, and the 
behavioural sciences, as well as economics (French, N. and French, S., 1997). Subsets of these, 
such as ethics (moral hazard, intrinsic motivation), risk taking (in particular, locus of control), 
leadership style, and organisational and ownership structure, are likely to be influential. Similarly, 
the effect the domain, or subject matter of the decision problem, more particularly the importance 
placed on it by the decision maker(s), would also appear significant (Rettinger, 2001). The 
amount and quality of information, and the time available to analyse it before decisions are 
required, are further factors which are likely to affect the decision making process and the quality 
of the outcome. Literature in these areas needs to be sought out and carefully examined.  
Our understanding of the factors which influence the decision making processes and their 
morphology, is fundamental to an understanding of (property) market dynamics. Individual 
personalities, the dynamic interaction between them, and any preferences that may emerge, are 
the ‘free radicals’ which make modelling a complex, and some would argue, a speculative 
process. However “results show that the behavioural rules that dominate consumer’s decision 
making determine the resulting market dynamics, ……….results also shows the importance of 
psychological variables like social networks, preferences, and the need for identity to explain the 
dynamics of the market.”(Janssen and Jager, 2001 p 745). An improved understanding of the 
CBD office market therefore requires that we understand these complex issues. Such an 
understanding will assist tenancy providers, property managers and tenants through a process 
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